IO security

An automation runtime bridges source, identity, secrets, networks, and managed targets. Its security review must cover the complete run path rather than only the execution process.

Security objectives

• Only authenticated, authorized requests enter execution.
• The executed content and dependencies match the reviewed immutable identity.
• Inputs cannot silently expand target or privilege scope.
• Secrets are resolved just in time, exposed only to the bounded workload, and excluded from durable metadata and logs.
• Runtime credentials and network access expire when no longer needed.
• Workloads are isolated in proportion to their risk and data classification.
• Runtime status and target acceptance remain distinguishable.
• Evidence is integrity-protected, access-controlled, redacted, and retained only as required.

Threat questions

Review how an implementation handles request forgery, replay, content substitution, dependency compromise, malicious inputs, confused-deputy authorization, secret exfiltration, cross-run data leakage, unbounded target selection, denial of service, log injection, and evidence tampering.

Least privilege

Separate requester, approver, runtime, observer, and evidence-reader responsibilities where the risk requires it. A human's broad platform access should not become the default runtime identity. Scope credentials to the operation and target, and prefer short lifetimes over reusable static values.

Incident boundary

If identity, content integrity, or secret confidentiality is in doubt, stop new execution according to the incident procedure, preserve authorized evidence, and rotate or revoke affected credentials. Do not publish raw diagnostics or internal endpoints while seeking support.

This page is a review model, not an assurance statement about a particular IO release. See the site-wide security overview and compliance mapping.